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Introduction 
    Over the past 15 years, the relative conomic position of these four East Asian 
countries has evolved a great deal. Japan, a distancing front runner at the beginning of 
the 1990s, had a miserable record of recession and a low growth) On the other end, 
mainland China presented every features of an underdeveloped country, with its rigid, 
centrally organized economic system and lack of technology and capital. However, the 
country could boast an astonishingly rapid economic growth in the last 15 years, so as to 
become one of the major world economic powers. The transition from a planned 
economy to a market-oriented system was achieved without major disturbance like in 
Russia. Therefore, China managed to partly catch up with the immense gap which 
existed between Japan and - to a lesser degree - Korea and Taiwan. Today, many firms in 
Asian countries are rivalling each other in a globalized market.
    Interwoven in the economic system of each country, employment relations have 
also evolved rapidly during the last 15 years. Particularly salient is the apparition of a free 
labour market mechanism in China. In those days, the firms (mostly state-owned) could
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not hire or dismiss workers according to economic fluctuations, and the workers enjoyed 
a quasi-absolute security of employment and welfare. But, with the introduction f 
foreign capitals and private companies, the Chinese firms now enjoy a latitude of 
decision-making possibilities in terms of hiring and dismissals. In fact, market 
mechanisms areperhaps more freely applied to China than in other Asian countries. In 
short, employment relations today are becoming comparable as to major trends in the 
four Asian countries.
    The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 hit East Asian countries with more or less 
severity. Obviously, Korea suffered most, following the bailout program of the IMF and 
its conditionaliity. But in other countries, too, the Asian crisis accelerated or retarded 
major economic or institutional reforms. In all four countries, changes in employment 
are perceptible today. This paper intends to highlight these major changes in a 
comparable and synthetic way.
    This paper will list, first, some features of labour markets in four countries (1); then 
account will be taken of major changes after the Asian financial crisis (II), followed by a 
short prospective s ction (Ill). 
I - Features of labour markets in East Asian countries
    In the past, it was customary to assume that East Asian countries differed 
enormously in terms of level of economic development and political regime and that 
economic and labour issues hould be treated separately, country by country. But after a 
series of recessions in Japan in the 1990s and a spectacular opening and high economic 
growth in mainland China, it is our contention that East Asian countries confront now 
similar issues in employment and industrial relations, and point to the same direction of 
changes. 
    Of course, among the four countries in our study, there are still many differences in 
per capita GDP, unemployment rate and union density, as is shown in Table 1. For 
instance, in 1999, per capita GDP by exchange rate ranged from US$780 in China to 
$32,230 in Japan. But if we use purchasing power parities, the difference ismuch less: 
from $3,291 to $24,041 (PPP of 1990). In fact, the Chinese conomy (particularly in its 
developed areas) is catching up rapidly with the other three market economies so that a
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comparison f labour issues in this region is nor without meaning. 
Table 1 
          Basic statistics of East Asian Countries (1999) 
            Per capita Per ccapita i Growth Unemployment Union 
              GNP GNP rate rate density 
                       (Ppp) 1990 -1998 2000 ~~ 1996 
   China 780 3,291 102% 3.1% 12.7% 
   Japan 32,230 24,041 1.8% 4.7% 22.4% 
   Korea 8,490 14,637 6,1% 4.1% 12.6% 
   Taiwan 12,4002 18,3202 6.4% 3.0% 33.2%r 
          Sources: World Development Report, World Bank 2000/2001 
          World Labour Report. ILO, 1997. Ajia Keizai 2000 
          Economic Planning Agency 2000 
     Notes: 
         1 1995 
          2 per capita GDP 
    Hereafter, we will underline the features of labour markets, which ate rather 
common in the four countries. 
1) Human resources are rich in quantitative and qualitative t rms. 
    The economic development i  the four countries appears to follow the same path: 
export-oriented strategy with good adaptation of human resources to demand 
conditions. At the beginning, labour-intensive ndustries were developed toearn foreign 
currencies and also to acquire acertain technology level (Japan 1920 - 1950s, Korea and 
Taiwan 1960 - 1970s, China 1980s) but swiftly, they could secure the needed skilled 
labour thanks to a huge investment in education (private and public investment)2.
2 Bouteiller , Eric / Fou 
La Decouverte, 2001.
qum, Michel : Le developpement economique de 1'Asie 
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orientale.
Today, high caliber IT engineers and technicians can be found as easily in Beijing as in 
Tokyo. 
2) Strong security of employment a tached to regular staff was the rule in large firms 
and in the public corporations. "Life-rime mployment" orcareer employment i  Japan 
and Korea were a well-known example, just as much as "ironship" in China. These long-
term employment relations with the firm or public corporations provided workers not 
only with steady earnings but also with a social status. These practices are now put into 
question in the four countries for various reasons (economic reforms of state-owned 
companies in China, drastic hanges in HRn4 in Korean firms after the Asian crisis, 
pressure for downsizing Japanese firms in the 1990s). 
3) Limited role of collective bargaining 
    For a long rime, labour unions were placed under state control in Korea and 
Taiwan. After the democratization of 1987, Korea moved toward a system of free 
collective bargaining but still Korean labour unions are divided and weak vis-3-vis the 
management. 
    In Japan, labour unions organize just around 20% of employed persons. Definitely 
collective bargaining (spring offensive) is playing a limited role in wage determination 
and other conditions of work and life (for example, social security). 
4) Labour law is often instituted or revised to avoid friction with the USA and other 
industrialized countries, 
   Taiwan adopted the labour standard law in 1984 following pressure from the USA 
(related to trade frictions). Japanese labour standard law was revised in 1987 to fix 
weekly hours at 40. The government stated that such a move was necessary to 
circumscribe international criticism. 
    Recently in Korea, the Labor Standard Law was revised so as to reduce statutory 
hours of work to 40 per week in 2003. In China, recent changes in rules and regulations 
are motivated to facilitate the entry into the WTO.
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5) Large Asian firms are expanding their activities in China 
    Active in a globalized market, large Asian firms, be they Japanese, Korean or 
Taiwanese, are investing a lot in China. Taiwanese funds are moving toward the 
Cantonese region and Hong Kong, whereas  heavy concentration of Japanese firms can 
be found in Dallian or Shanghai. With the opening of the Chinese market, capital is 
moving easily from one country to another beyond national borders. In contrast to 
labour matters, a sub-regional market is already created in terms of production and 
financing. Thus, many factors are now pushing national labour markets owards more 
mobile and competitive ones. 
11 - Major changes in employment relations 
1) China 
    The Chinese conomic performance was only slightly affected by the Asian 
financial crisis. GDP growth, which stood at 9.6 in 1996, went down to 7.1 in 1999. 
Probably the boom of IT investment in China could offset the consequences of the crisis 
in neighboring countries. 
    The number ofworking people by form of company reveals a remarkable change in
recent years. In2000, there were 128.2 million workers incollectively owned firms, 91.2 
million in private foreign companies, 81.0 million in state-owned firms and 15.0 million 
in collective companies. Over ten years, private foreign companies ncreased more than 
three times, whereas state-owned companies, which used to occupy the bulk of the 
industrial work force, lost 10 million people. Thus, a major shift owards private foreign 
firms occurred at the detriment of inefficient state-owned companies. 
    Traditionally, employment i  state-owned companies meant to be covered by a 
total welfare system, which the firm used to take in charge. Corporate welfare covered 
not only income but also social benefits (medical care and pension). This outdated and 
inefficient system is now under fire. A major step towards the rationalization of state-
owned companies was the institution oftemporary la -off (shagan) whereby redundant 
workers are placed on a temporary lay-off. They receive allowances and generally have 
access tovocational retraining programs. This lay-off may last 3 years or more3. 
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     In 1999, laid-off workers who were not reemployed amounted to 6 million in 
addition to 3 million newly laid-off in that year, which gives the magnitude of the issue. 
Reemployment of laid-off workers is made difficult because of personal characteristics 
(age, skills, family) and also due to limited mobility. 
    Registered unemployment stood at 6 million in 2000 or a rate of 3.1% 
(unemployment rate is calculated on the basis of registered urban population). Some 
sample surveys estimate an unemployment rate as high as 7.4%. Given the natural 
growth of the population and an inflow of rural population i to urban areas, itwould be 
necessary to maintain ahigh growth rate (7-8%) for some time to meet he demographic 
pressure. 
    The magnitude of employment problems could be illustrated by the size of 
temporary workers with a rural civil status. In 2003, 120 million temporary workers were 
counted in urban areas uch as Beijing, Shenzhan and Shanghai4. These workers are 
given temporary work permits because of the system of registration of the rural 
population. In fact, the registration policy has been conceived so as to avoid chaotic 
migrations from poor rural areas into urban centers. But because of the rapid expansion 
of urban areas and a deepening of income distribution, the pressure is put on the 
registration policies pursued so far to be amended. 
    Union density in China was estimated at 12.7% in 1999. It appears that labour 
unions are hardly represented in private foreign companies. Terms and conditions of 
work seem to he determined by the market conditions (except minimum wages). Thus, 
in China, employment relations are changing rapidly from the complete security of 
employment to a more market-oriented in ividual employment contract system, in line 
with the growth of private foreign companies.
3 Hatsuoka, Shoichiro (ed. 1998): "Shakaiteki Kosei no Asia o Mezashite" (for a socially 
equitable Asia). 
Zhan, Qiujian (1999): Lay-off and Reemployment of Women Workers in China. 
Conference paper, 5th Social Asia Forum, Beijing. 
9 Jiang Yin : a Protection of rights for rural workers s. Paper presented to the 10th Social 
Asian Forum, Oct. 2004 (Seoul). 
6
2) Japan
    In Japan, the impact of the Asian crisis was compounded with a series of recessions 
beginning in 1991. The overall growth rate of GDP in the 1990s was a modest 1.30/6 per 
year and in 1998 registered a negative growth (-0.5°/u). After the burst of the "bubble", 
assets and equity went into a slow but steady downward spiral, as illustrated by the 
average price of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Table 2, Nikkei Average).
Table 2
Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(First section)
 Year
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001
   Nikkei '. 
stock average 
(225 Issues) 
   (Yen) 
 22,983.77 -
 16,924.95 
 17,417.24 
 19,723.06 
 19,868.15 
 19.361.35 
  15.258.74 
 13,842.17 
 18,934.34 
 13,785,69 
 10.542.62
Source: Tokyo Stock Exchange 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun
    In line with stock prices, the value of assets and land depreciated, which put most 
financial institutions in a dangerous situation, since they had heavily financed the 
purchase on a large scale of real estate property through construction/real estate firms. 
Outstanding loans on assets, which tended to loose their value in a deflationary period, 
have become a critical issue, not only for the financial institutions but also for the whole 
Japanese economy. In the manufacturing sector, particularly in the traditional sector, 
many Japanese firms could not sustain the cost competition against China, with a result 
that they had to shift production sites to China. The domestic industrial production in
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the 1990s tayed at a complete standstill (0% growth). 
     In this changing context, aggregate data on employment by sector eveal some 
interesting facts (Tables 3and 4). 
   Table 3 
              Employment indices for regular employees 
                      by industry in Japan 
    (1995= 100) 
IYear.All industries lConstruction Manu- (m which) ~7ranspor- 'Financing Services 
    30 Ifacturing Electrical ltatlon and 
    employees machinery equipment insurance 
     or more equipment i I 
i and supplies 
1991 97.2 90.9 104.3 109.9 1 105.3 102.1 90.9 
 1992 99.3 93.9 105.0 109.9 - 105.7 101.9 94,2 
1993 100.5 1 96.8 104.2 107, 2 104.5 101.2 97.0 
1994 100.5 ~ 99,8 1C1.9 102.8 101,9 .01 .2 98.9 I 
1995 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 
f 1996 99.6 100.6 97.8 97.3 97.3 97.5 101.6 
1997 99.8 101,4 96.9 96.4 97.0 93.4 103.3 
1998 99.9 98.9 95.6 95.7 96.0 90.3 105.3 2000 97.7 97.5 1 93.1 92.7 90.6 J 85.4 106.6 2000 97.6 94.3 900,9 90.7 90.6 85.4 107.5 
                                        Source: Monthly Labour Survey 
    In the 1990s, the employment level decreased in the manufacturing sector, as well 
as in financing and insurance, particularly from 1995. The number of people working in 
services remained on the rise for the entire period. Employment in the manufacturing 
sector (particularly competitive industries) lost more than one million jobs each in the 
two sub-periods 1990-1995 and 1995-2000.
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Table 4
Employment in Japan by sector
(thousand)
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale, retail 
and restaurants 
Financing and insurance
 Services_ 
 Total
i
t
1985
5,270
13,970
13.380
1,730
11,950 
58,360
1 1990 
5,840
14,640
13,800
1,970
13,890 
61,680
1995 2000
64,140 62,980
Differences
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale, retail 
and restaurants 
Financing and insurance
Semites
1990-1995
790
1,090
820
iC
2,050
i
1995-2000
-340
-1 ,330
-300
-22C
1,330
i
t 
i
Total 2,460 -1 ,16C
Source: Census (various years)
    Employment levels in financing and insurance reflect the problem of this sector. In 
fact, financial institutions (banking and insurance) were closely regulated by the mighty 
Ministry of Finance and also protected by it. But at the end of 1997, two liquidations of 
top financial firms (Yamaichi Security and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank) signaled the end 
of such a protection. Therefore, the employment level in this sector emained high in the 
first period 1990-1995 and restructuring became apparent in the period 1995-2000. 
Given the difficulties in this sector, employment reductions seem to be still mild up to
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2000. The financial institutions used to represent a high esteemed and well paid sector, 
offering the best career employment. But such public opinion came to a sudden end with 
the two above infamous liquidations. 
    Traditionally in Japan, employment adjustments in tunes of recession are carried 
out under determined pattern: regulation of overtime, freeze or reduction of recruitment 
other than new graduate, internal transfer, temporary lay-off with government subsidies. 
    If these measures are not sufficient, firms may freeze new recruirments, erminate 
contract of part-time workers before resorting to voluntary departure and dismissals. 
This procedure isestablished bycase law against unfair dismissal (abuse of rights). 
    A conventional view of employment adjustments advanced first by Prof. K. Koike 
is that most Japanese firms tend to resort to employment reductions after two 
consecutive y ars of deficits or a year with substantial losses,. This view is now under fire 
by several econometric studies. For example, Nakata and Takehiro (2001), using micro 
panel data of large firms in automobile, supermarkets, department s ores and trading 
(1974-1999) found that these firms frequently adjusted their employment level with 
traditional methods (regulation ofworking time in automobile, substitution ofpart-time 
workers for regular employees)6. Aggregate mployment level in the manufacturing 
sector (tables 3 and 4) seems to confirm the conclusions of the above study, that is, 
Japanese firms in competitive (non protected) sectors had to quickly adjust heir 
employment level to demand conditions.
    Another sign of changing employment relations i the steady increase of atypical 
employment'. In 1987, typical employment (regular employees) accounted for 83.9% of 
total employment, while atypical forms of employment accounted for 16.1%, of which 
10.3% in part-time jobs. In 1999, atypical forms of employment climbed to 27.5% - of
 Koike, Kazoo (1983) : a Kaiko Kara mica Gendai Nihon no Roshi Kankei n 
(Redundancies and Industrial Relations) in T. Moriguchi et al. "Nihon Keizai no Kozo 
Bunseki" (Structural nalysis of the Japanese Economy). 
s Lee, Eddy (1999) : a The Asian financial Crisis a, ILO 1999. 
Nakata, Yoshifumi / Takehiro, Ryoji: "Nihon Kigyo ni Okeru Koyo Chosei" 
(Employment adjustment in Japanese firms) in T. Tachibanaki and D. Wise ed. "Kigyo 
Kodo to Rodoshijo" (Behavior f firms and labour markets).
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which part-time jobs 20.3%, fixed-term contracts 2.3%, casual jobs 1.8% and temporary 
agent workers 1.1%. Firms are now using atypical forms of employment whenever they 
can use it, because the wages they pay to part-time mployees or temporary workers are 
much lower than those of regular employees and they are not covered by collective 
bargaining (so they are easy to dismiss). Labour unions confined to organize regular 
(core) employees of large firms are powerless against the development of atypical forms 
of employment.
    Thus, employment relations in Japan are becoming less stable in duration and their 
forms more diversified. Under these circumstances, a demand from business circles for a 
greater mobility of workers and enhancing their employability resemble anegation of the 
career employment system, which they strived to build in the past.
3) Korea
    The Financial Crisis and Employment Restructuring 
    The 1997-1998 financial crisis has made tremendous impact on the Korean labor 
market. In particular, due to the unprecedented pressure on Korean firms to undergo 
restructuring and reengineering processes in order to maintain their economic 
competitiveness, there have been two prominent phenomena in the employment pattern 
of Korean firms. First, there has been unprecedented scope of employment reductions 
virtually in every industry in Korea. Second, there has been a drastic increase of new type 
of employment, namely contingent labor force.
    The economic competitiveness of Korea deteriorated substantially in the early 
1990s. Korean products were higher priced than those from low-wage competitors (i.e., 
China, Thailand, and Malaysia), and their quality was known to be inferior to that of 
high value-added competitors (i.e., Europe, Japan, and the U.S.). The slowdown of 
Korean economy had already begun in the early 1990s, and the 1997-1998 financial
9 Ogura , Kazuo (2002): "Hitenkei Koyo no Kokusai Hikaku" (International 
Comparison of atyppical employment), Nihon Rodo Kenkyu Zasshi No. 505. 
Suzuki, Hiromasa / Ogura, Kazuo (2000): Development of atypical forms of 
employment: How Japan differs from European countries (France in particular). 
Proceedings of the l2thIIRA World Congress (Tokyo).
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crisis seemed to be a culmination of declining economic competitiveness 
Kim)s.
(Kim and
    Around the period when the Korean government sought the IMF rescue package in 
November 1997, several economic indexes changed rapidly. For example, the foreign 
exchange rate (Won/$) depreciated from 921.85 in October 1997 to 1706.8 in January 
1998. Just for a month after November 19, 1997, when Korea decided to seek help from 
the IMF, the value of the Korean Won fell by about 50 percent against the US dollar, 
and the stock market dropped some 60 percent.
    The IMF bailout program provided a comprehensive financing package of about 
US$65 billions on both a multilateral and bilateral basis. In return, the Korean 
government was required to provide containment of inflationary pressure through tight 
monetary and fiscal policy; fundamental restructuring of the financial sector; and 
reduction of corporations' excessive reliance on short-debt financing. In particular, the 
IMF requested the Korean government o take steps to improve labor market flexibility 
(Park, 1998)9.
    Korean government officials under pressure from the IMF insisted that securing 
labor market flexibility was the only approach to improving the economic 
competitiveness of Korean firms, and encouraged private firms to implement bold 
restructuring programs, including massive layoffs.
    The financial crisis of November 1997 also led the three actors to form the 
Tripartite Commission, which otherwise would not have been possible because of the 
hostile relationship between labor and the statel0. In the past, the Korean government 
considered organized labor as an obstacle to economic development, ried to subordinate 
official labor unions to the state, and suppressed any independent labor movement.
e Kim, Dong-One / Kim, Seongsu: "Globalization, Financial Crisis and Industrial 
Relations: The Case of Korea". Industrial Relations. no3 July 2003 
5 Park, Young-Bum (1998) : "" The Financial Crisis in Korea : the Industrial Relations 
Connection,,. Perspectives on Work: the Magazine of the IRRA 2 (2): 37-41 
10 The following analysis reproduces the contribution of D-O Kim and Y-S Park for the 
IIRA World Congress, Sept. 2003.
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    However, the creation of the Tripartite Commission implied that the Korean 
government regarded labor at [east as a partner for negotiations and compromise. The 
Tripartite Commission had two purposes: to accomplish restructuring of the Korean 
economy and the labor market in a more consensual way, and to revise Korean labor law 
according to the OECD and ILO standards.
    On January 20, 1998, all parties to the Tripartite Commission announced the first 
Tripartite Joint Statement identifying the goal of economic reform and the principle of 
fair burden sharing. On February 9, 1998 the Tripartite Commission agreed to major 
agenda items and announced Social Compact o the public. In return for accepting 
immediate implementation f layoffs of redundant labor force with six-month advance 
notices, unions and workers gained additional legalization of basic labor rights such as 
(1) the right to establish workplace association for government employees beginning 
January 1.999; (2) the right to organize trade unions by teachers beginning July 1999; (3) 
the right of unions to engage in political activities by revising the Elections Act and the 
Political Funds Act during the first half of 1998; (4) the right of unemployed tojoin 
trade unions organized on the trans-enterprise l vel beginning 1999. The "Great 
Compromise" ofFebruary 1998 (as popular press calls the Social Compact) was the first 
autonomous agreement made by labor, management, and the state in Korea. While the 
Social Compact improved the government's crisis management capacity and helped the 
country overcome the credit crunch, it also prompted the implementation f successive 
waves of layoffs.
    Faced by the sudden economic risis, Korean employers actively pursued numerical 
and external f exibility through layoffs, outsourcing, and the use of contingent workers. 
Economic and employment adjustment programs (downsizing, restructuring, exchange 
of business units among chaebols), have been pursued by firms under the initiative of the 
government prompted by the IMF.
    Consequently, he number of employment labor force declined sharply by more 
than one million from 13,226,000 in December 1997 to 12,190,000 in December 1998 
(National Statistic Office, Various Years). Among the unemployed people with job 
experience, 13.6% were victims of the bankruptcy of firms, whereas 56.9% were those of 
employment adjustment programs during the financial crisis (National Statistical Office, 
February-December 1998). The unemployment rate in Korea recorded a more than
13
four-fold increase during the 16-month period from 2.1 percent in October 1997 to 8.6 
percent in February 1999. As shown in Table 5, the number of the unemployed 
dramatically rose from 426 million in 1996 to 1,461 million in 1998, an almost three-
fold increase in two years. While the Unemployment Insurance Act was made effective in 
July 1995, the coverage of the Act was shallow and limited. Consequently, most 
unemployed people experienced severe conomic hardships. 
   Table 5.
Yea 
! 
      Labor 
      Force 
 1993 19,328      ( 6,291) 
 1994 19,905      ( 6
,959) 
 1995 20,432       (17,652) 
 1996 
1 106       (18,133)  1997 2
      (18,479) 
 1998 19,994      ( 7,348)
 Employment Size: Finance and Insurance Industry and Bank 1) 
            (Unit: in thousands of persons, %) 
Aq Indus !Finance Bank: - -
  (. _ land :Employment                          (
,Insurance 
r
Unampt U          nempl 
loymsnf: oyment        Rate         (%)    551 
_ (525) (3.1) 
    490 2.4   
_ (469) (2_7) 
    420 2.0 
  (405) _(22)
426 
(414) 
556 
(539)
      
f Employment 
  289 616
 2.C 
(2.2)
l
I s r c  
-;Industry;:
1,461 
(1,420)
 2.6 
(2.8)
 6.8 
(7.6)
t,
16 
654 
687 
708 
732 r 725
7ofa3._-
 264.712 
 197.098 
206.292 
 231.12 7 
213.068 
'
, 183.175
678 165.837 C
675 167.163 1 1
oyntent 
   ~Centra[ 
F Domestic Foreign    'B
ank. Bank 'i Bank 
12 2.168 260.283 2.261 
98T 1.923 192.360 2.815 
29992 1.704 202.101 2.487 
1271 2.194 226.016 2.917 
68 
i1 1.558 208.990 0 
, 75 3.004 177.301 2.87701 
37 0 949 162.537 2.351 63 ,8162.259  3.060
4,97
7.917
672   n/a ~ n/a n/a n/a,
1) Source: Korea National Statistical Office, Labor Population Survey, Various years 
         Korea National Statistical Office, Basic Business Establishment Data, Various 
         years 
2) Non-farm employment figures in the parentheses. 
    Another emerging pattern is the increasing usage of a contingent labor force. As the 
number of contingent workers rose after the financial crisis, the Law on Protecting 
Dispatched Workers was passed in February 1998 to regulate their use.
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    The proportion of contingent workers to employed population in Korea rose 
sharply from 46 percent in 1997 to 53 percent in 2000 (National Statistical Office, 
Various Issues).[I Contingent workers usually replaced regular workers, and there was 
little difference in terms of task, duty and workload. The wage level for contingent 
workers, however, is40 to 80 percent of the regular workers' wage. Also, the social safety 
net for contingent workers is generally unreliable, because employers often fail to pay 
premiums for medical insurance, unemployment i surance, social security program, and 
workers' compensation forcontingent workers. 
    New Developments i  Industrial Relations 
    The deadlock of the Social Compact has lead to unexpected changes in Korean 
Industrial Relations. The radical movement KCTU was finally legalized after 1997 as a 
national federation and has come to compete with the moderate FKTU. A major change 
has been the rise of KCFU in the private as well as in the public sectod2. As of the end 
of 2002, the membership ofFKTU was 880,000 against 689,000 for KCPU. However, 
large firms such as Hyundai and Daewo pertain to KCTU along with some public sector 
unions (railways, electricity, gas, etc.). Reflecting this rise of radical tendency, labour 
disputes have been growing; in 2000 there were 200 cases of labour disputes with 1.8 
million days lost and in 2003, 320 cases were recorded with 1.3 million days lost. 
    KCTU seems to have gathered a certain momentum both in the private and public 
sectors. In reflection of this rising militancy, labour disputes are on the rise; i n 1997, 
there were 78 strikes with 450,000 days lost but in 2003, 320 strikes were reported with
t t The concept of contingent workers defined by the National Statistical Office is 
believed to be rather wide, because it includes all employees with shorter-than-one-year 
employment contracts, and employees who stayed on the job longer than one year but 
are ineligible to some benefits (such as lump-sum severance pay). If one uses an 
alternative estimation using a narrow definition, which include only employees with 
shorter-than-one-year employment contract and nonstandard employees such as part 
timers, teased employees, and employees from temporary help agencies, the proportion 
of contingent workers to employed population was approximately 29.3% in 2000 (Jung, 
2000). 
12 Nho, Yong-Jin : "Features of the present Korean Industrial Relations", paper 
presented to the 10th Social Asian Forum, Oct. 2004 (Seoul). 
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1.3 million lost days. 1n 2004, because of several strikes in the public sector as well as in 
the private sector, the number of strikes is expected to go beyond 500 cases. Around 
70% of strikes occurred in the KC U sector. Moreover, KCC'U has so far succeeded to 
organize some industrial federations (metal, health and medical workers, teachers' 
union). These industrial federations accounted for 41% of all KCTU members. It 
appears, therefore, that part of the Korean unionism is heading towards industrial level 
negotiations similar to European unionisme, whereas FKTU is basically entreprise 
unionism on the model of Japanese labour unions. it is, however, premature to say which 
tendency will prevail in the near future.
4) T aiwan
   Although the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 had little impact on Taiwan, we have 
witnessed that Taiwan's economy has been suffering from the most dramatic depression, 
with a negative annual rate of economic growth and a record high unemploymentt3.
Table 7
A comparison of capital formation among 
   Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea
i Taiwan Japan South Korea
1994
1
8.9
Growth Rate I" Growth Rate
of GDP i' of Capital_ > forrpation
0.3
Percentage7 
in Gf}P in GDPercent
27.825.0
age Percentage ',
P' in GQP
366
995 8 5 11.4 24.9 28.0 37.3
1996 9.2 3.4 22.9 28.8 38.1
1997 8.1 18.E 24.0 28.3 34.4
1998 7.0 11.8 24.7 26.5 21.5
1999
i
4.1 -0.7 23.2 25.5 27.0
2000 4.7 15.7 22.6 25.6
2001 -2.2 -29 .2 17.4 25.1
28.3
26.7
2002 2.5 0.7 17.3 -
Source: 1. Directorate-General of Budget Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan,ROC, 
       Quarterly National Economic Trends, Taiwan Area, ROC, No, 96, Feb. 2002. 
     2. The figures of 2002 are predicted.
13 This section basically reproduces the 
Congress, Sept. 2003,
contribution of P.T. Pang for the IIRA World
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    In 1990s, the frame of Taiwan's national economy had to be changed as a result of 
an effort joining the GATT, transformed into the WTO in 1995. In the meantime, 
Taiwan had much trouble facing the increasing outflows of both capital and industry 
into mainland China, which accelerated the speed of a fundamental change in the 
market structure, not only in finance and capital, but also in commodities and labor. 
    Basically, in the 1990s, the percentage of Taiwan's commodity trade with the US 
went down to the lowest level, while the number of experts into mainland China was 
increasing sharply. 
     It was surprising that the less pressure from the US government, the fewer experts 
were going to the US. This shows that before the 1990s, what motivated Taiwan to face 
globalization had been a force from the outside, and that after the 1990s what enforced 
Taiwan to incline to trade circle with mainland China was a force from within. That is 
why the 1990s has been seen as a transition period for Taiwan's economy. 
    In fact, the change in Taiwan's economy could trace back to the late 1980s, when 
the NT dollar was rapidly appreciated under the pressure from the US. However, 
Taiwan experienced a booming picture at the time. 
    A rapid deregulation a d privatization were supposed to be necessary in raising the 
efficiency of the market. This resulted in a money plethora nd the so-called bubble 
economy. Inevitably, Taiwan's economy moved in reverse with the Asian Financial Crisis 
in 1997. Then, the Keynesian big government returned. The increase of public 
expenditure with a cheap money policy was introduced to defend against a collapse of 
economic irculation. 
    In the 1990s, four major changes occurred in Taiwan: 
    The first, as the monetary sector crisis deepened, the power of the financial 
combination between the bank groups and industrial groups was seriously eroded. The 
stock holding among group companies also declined. As large financial holding 
companies shown up, inter-group mergers became indispensable to survive competition. 
    The second, in order to stabilize the financial market, he finance regulation power 
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in the government strengthened considerably, while facing the gigantic bad debts of 
financial institutions. However, under the introduction of cutting business tax, public 
money, and the postponement of pay-off, the structural change of this sector has been 
put off. Yet banking and financial sectors are still dependent on government's power. 
Statistics hows that this problem is getting worse. After the Asian crisis, in Taiwan, by 
means of the ratio of overdue accounts to loans, the percentage didn't slow down, but up 
to 12% in 2001 from 6% in 1997.
    The third, the amount of foreign direct investment into Taiwan increased 
dramatically after the Asian crisis. A new competition was brought into the Taiwan's 
market. Under this circumstance, native Taiwan's companies were compelled to 
transform their performance as to fir the global level. For the protected small and 
medium-sized industries, it seems difficult to deal with this problem smoothly. 
    The fourth, the dependence of Taiwan's economy over mainland China has been 
deepening these days, not only in outward direct investment, but also in foreign trade. 
This shows that the labor-intensive manufacturing industries have been declining. 
    To put it briefly, the decade of the 1990s, for Taiwan, was a historical turning 
point in facing both US-oriented globalization and mainland China-oriented regional 
economy. 
Some features of Taiwan's labor market in the 1990s.
    Within the context of this tide of globalization, Taiwan's labor market also came to 
change in the 1990s, By means of labor market outcomes, employees' earnings have been 
increasing over time. 
    During the last decade, average monthly earnings of employees in manufacturing 
sectors have risen by an annual 7 %. Yet in terms of GDP, the share of employees 
compensation in GDP has been quite stable, varying between 55% and 58%. In contrast 
to the functional distribution of income, the personal distribution of income has 
worsened in recent years. By means of a Lorenz curve, it is obvious that the degree of 
income inequality is getting greater over time. The difference of the first quintile over the 
top quintile enlarged sharply, from 5.1.8 in 1990 up to 6.39 in 2001. It is to say that the
18
distribution of income in Taiwan has got to concentrate toward both ends as a result of 
the poorest being worse off and the richest being better off. 
    This pattern of income distribution may be substantiated by the changes of the 
labor market. The reasons for the worsening trend in income inequality are: 
    Firstly, one of the main characteristics of Taiwan's economy, i.e. the low rate of 
unemployment, carne to change from 1.7% in 1990 up to 5.3% in 2001. In particular, 
most of the unemployed, over 5 hundred thousand, are middle-aged and older workers. 
Rather, during the last decade, the amount of inactive people increased from 5.7 million 
in 1990 up to 7.1 million in 2001. This shows that even though the government 
expanded public expenditures, the tendency towards decline in the labor-intensive 
manufacturing industries cannot be stopped these days. Instead, the service industries 
became a sponge of employment, but had little effect. 
    Secondly, the decline in the number of employees in manufacturing and the 
growth of services were going in an opposite movement. As to occupation type, the 
number of blue-collar workers declined, while clerical workers following behind this 
trend. Yet, owing to the rapid growth in the information sectors, alabor shortage in the 
field of technical nd professional jobs is occurring these days.
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Table 8
Taiwan's Manpower Surveys
l
Each De-ffw-aphic Group
I , Sham of Total Population
not itabor Labor LFPR V . RForce Force 
„Male Female i
1986
1987
Wndeii4 i . 15-64 66
G
7945 5216 75.15 4,5 5129.01 65.71
28.39 66.06
5.28 27
5.54 8183
5449
5248 1 75.24 46.54 2.0
i 1988 27.96
27.50
_ 66.30 5.74_.-
66.54 1
K47 74.83 ! 45.56 1.7
1989 5.9E 8390 5565 74.8 I 45.35_. 4 1.6
1.71990 27.08 66.70 6.22 8423 5795 73.96
26.34 67.13 6.53 8569 I` 5927 73,80
73.78
44.39
44.83
1.5
1.5
1 1991
1 25.77 67.42 I 6.81 8765 6006
1993 25.15 _ 67.75 -7-.1C- 8874 6213 72.67 I _44.89
72.44 T 45.40
1.5
1994 24.41 68.21 7.38 9081 6321 I 1.6 '
1995 23. 77 ! 68.60
15 68.99
7.64 9210 6478 F 72.034 1.8
11996 23. 7.86 9310
9432
6621
6738
71.13 45.76 2.6
1997 22.60 1 69.34 , 8.06 71.09 45.64 2.7
1998 21.96 69.79 ! 8.26 9546
F
70.58 45.6C 2.7
1999 21.4 70.' 8.4
6902
9668 020 1 69.93 46.03 29
2000 21.1 70.3 8.6 T--9784 7178 69.42 46.02 3.0
Source, 
Table
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive 
Monthly Bulletin of Manpower Statistics, Taiwan Area, ROC, Mar. 2001. 
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              Employment by Industry
Yuan. ROC.
I 
i
r
I
Total Primary Industry Secondary M1 Tertiary Industry '..
Thousand 1
Persons
ThousandThousand I ' Thousand -/.
Persons . 7o Persons Persons to
1986 7733 100.0 1317 1 17.0 1 3215 1 41.6 3201 41.4
1987 8022 100.0 1 1226 15.3 343 242.8 3366 42.0
1988 8107 100.0 j 1112 13.7 3443 42.5 3551 43.8
1989 8258 1 100.C 1066 12.9 3476 42.1 3717 45.0
1990 8283 100.0 1064 12.8 1 3382 40.8 3837 46.3
1991 8439 100.0 1093 13.C 337C 39.9 3977 47.1
21992
8632 100.C 1065 12.3 3419 1 39.6 4148 48.1 1
11993 8745 j 100.0 1005 11.5 3418 39.1 4323 49.4
1994 8939 100.0 976 10.9 3506 39.2 4456 49.9
1995 9045 100.C 954 10.5 3504 38.7 4587 50.7
1996 9068 100.0 928 10.2 3389 37.4 4751 52.3
I11997 9176 I 100.0 87P 9.6 3502 j 38.2 4795 52.3 1
1998 9289 100.0 822 8.8 3523 37.9 4944 53.2
1999 9385 100.0 776 8.3 1 3492 37.2 5116 54.5
2000 9491 100.0 1 74C 7.8 i 3534 37.2 5218 55.0
Source: See Table 6.
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    Thirdly, in spite of the slogan of "work equality between sexes", female workers are 
mostly at a marginal field on each segment of the labor market. The female labor force 
participation rate has been always down to the level of 46%.
    Fourthly, an increase in foreign workers seems to provide a buffer for the labor 
shortage in traditional sectors. Needless to say, this is the outcome of a heavy increase of 
payroll in local workers, who are covered under "The Labor Standard Law" stipulating 
minimum wage, fringe benefits, severance pay, and retirement pay. It also shows that 
even big firms in Taiwan cannot afford to support the quasi-fixed costs to keep local 
workers.
Changes in Taiwan's employment relations in the 1990s.
    In Taiwan, the trade unions are nothing but existing. Workers always rely on the 
state through the function of regulation, instead of the unions through the mechanism of 
collective bargain.
    Since labour unions have little effect on management, Taiwan's employment 
relations tend to be determined by an internal labor market and by the provisions of 
"The Labor Standard L aw". This kind of employment system is basically management-
oriented, with implicit contract employment, seniority-based wage system and non 
union-based corporate governance.
    In the 1990's, this style of employment relations is changing slowly under the 
context of globalization and IT revolution. At the managerial level, bottom-up and 
group-centered ecision-making mode had to be changed under the changes in 
managerial hierarchy. The functions of line and staff are separated and the job ladders are 
cut out dramatically. Asa result, middle-aged managers are badly hit by this reform. In 
addition, restructuring of organization, such as closing factories and dismissing 
employees, has struck a hard blow against middle-aged and older workers.
    At the workshop level, the change is more directly connected with restructuring. 
Many big firms have redundancy plans, which have hit blue-collar workers. In the 
factories, upgrading industrial structure, such as robotization, is also supposed to be an 
important means to survive competition and to escape from over production and excess
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capacity. 
    As to the labour disputes, they arc increasing over the matters of dismissals and 
redundancy. But labour unions play little role since Taiwan's unions take for granted 
labor issues as government's affairs. In the 1990s, Taiwan was in a dilemma. Under the 
pressure of globalization, Taiwan is now changing slowly and gradually. The main 
characteristic of this changing process is, in short, changing without consensus. A big 
change is supposed to be coming but not yet. 
    Though it survived the bubble economy with the Keynesian-type big government, 
an effect of the public expenditure kept Taiwan from facing the problems. But under the 
surface, the differential in the income distribution enlarged by some features of Taiwan's 
labor market in the 1990s, a structural change in Taiwan's economy and employment 
relations occurred as well.
III - Changing employment relations in East Asian Countries 
    The Asian financial crisis and its following adjustments have clearly accelerated the 
rhythm of change regarding employment relations in this sub-region. Even prior to the 
crisis, factor mobility - capital - increased considerably thanks to the opening of the 
Chinese market. After the crisis, most firms in the four countries have been forced to 
adapt heir production and employment level to the global competition. Because of the 
competitive pressure, they could not maintain stable mployment relations, which had 
certain motivating as well as skill acquisition functions. 
    In view of the competitive consideration, most firms have sought flexibility through 
the increase of atypical forms of employment (contingent workers) and a reduction of 
core staff. It seems premature, however, to consider these changes as definitive for mainly 
two reasons.
    Long-term employment was conceived to increase human capital by providing a 
longer period of returns. Individual firms could retain (from inside or outside) necessary 
skills, basically because the labour market conditions were extremely oose, as shown by 
the unemployment rate and the rise of the inactive population. It is to be seen if such a 
pro-management situation would continue.
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    Secondly, related with the above, is the weakness of the social safety net in this 
region. Unemployment benefits exist only in Korea and Japan but their level is 
continually eroded ue to financial constraints. In addition, Asian workers are not 
mobile since in the past external labour markers only existed for higher caliber 
professionals andlow skilled jobs. This means Chat middle-aged and elderly workers who 
are made redundant will have great difficulties to find a job, even with a substantial w ge 
cut. The burden of recessions is not at all evenly shared between the different groups of 
workers and between the management and he workers. 
    If the present search for flexibility continues for some time, the dissatisfied and 
discomforted workers will look for certain voice and support. In this respect, the rise of 
militancy in Korean labour movements may portend such tendency. 
    Withh regard m globalization, two major questions should be raised in this sub-
region. The first question is: How to ensure a certain mechanism of collective oice of 
workers infront of globalized firms? 
    Secondly, there is an institutional v cuum at the sub-regional level. This is a pity 
for the four countries concerned, which - 4 or 5 centuries ago - had shared the same 
civilization.
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